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‘We know what it is when you do not ask us’: 





A brief beginning on the tyranny of titles: ‘the unchallengeable nation’ refers 
obliquely to the series of lectures at the University of British Columbia in which this 
material was first aired, a series on ‘Challenging Nation.’ Then the title proper is 
taken from Bagehot’s saying of nation: ‘We know what it is when you do not ask us, 
but we cannot very quickly explain or define it.’1 It is a recycled title but 
unavoidable.2 The first excuse for such recycling is that Bagehot’s saying 
encapsulates what I want to say. Bluntly, my argument will be that we find it difficult 
to challenge nation because we cannot say what it is so as to identify it explicitly and 
thence confront it. A little more exactly, we are unable to do this from within the 
uniform plane of modernity since nation occupies a sacral dimension of being which 
the modern cannot integrate. Giving effect to that dimension may enable us to 
challenge modernist conceptions of nation, however. The other excuse for titular 
repetition refines that challenge. It stems not so much from wanting to reverse the 
more usual academic practice – offering here the same title but a different paper 
instead of much the same paper with a different title – as from wanting to intimate a 
continuance, a sustaining of nation despite, and because of, its elusiveness, and from 
                                                 
* Thanks to Catherine Dauvergne for the generosity of the invitation to give this talk. And, for the 
generosity that accompanied it, thanks to Catherine again, to Ruth Buchanan, Dianne Newell and the 
Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies, Susan Boyd, Claire Young, and Wes Pue. Although their 
attempts to saturate me with the relevant knowledge may not have been entirely successful, my 
failures, inevitable and otherwise, would have been much more conspicuous without the generosity, 
concern and companionship of Brenna Bhandar, Stewart Motha and Sara Ramshaw during this venture. 
Richard Joyce made invaluable editorial contributions to this version. 
1 Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics, or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of Natural 
Selection and Inheritance to Political Society (Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner: London, n.d.) at 20-1. 
2 Cf Peter Fitzpatrick ‘“We know what it is when you do not ask us”: Nationalism as Racism’ in Peter 
Fitzpatrick (ed.), Nationalism, Racism and the Rule of Law (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995) 3-26.  
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wanting to show how, in terms of that very sustaining, nation is challenged 
intrinsically. This is where law, inevitably, will come in.  
THE ELUSIVE NATION 
Let me first compensate for that opaque opening by way of the pellucid genius of 
Virginia Woolf. Woolf was certainly no nationalist but she showed the most attuned 
appreciation of nation in Mrs Dalloway where, close to the beginning, she describes 
the mysterious yet palpable passage, a slow and silent passage, through an exalted part 
of London of a stately motor car, one containing ‘a face of the very greatest 
importance,’ a presence that somehow evokes nation but cannot be exactly identified, 
an inscrutable presence resonant with authority and effect yet a mystery that ‘had 
brushed…[the onlookers] with her wing,’ momentarily suspending the transactions of 
ordinary life and inducing an intangible apprehension (‘The world has raised its whip; 
where will it descend?’), yet inducing also an expansion of the soul: ‘Mr. Bowley, 
who had rooms in the Albany and was sealed with wax over the deeper sources of 
life…could be unsealed suddenly, inappropriately, sentimentally, by this sort of 
thing;’ or the flower-seller ‘shawled Moll Pratt…would have tossed the price of a pot 
of beer – a bunch of roses – into St. James’s Street out of sheer light-heartedness and 
contempt of poverty had she not seen the constable’s eye upon her, discouraging an 
old Irishwoman’s loyalty.’3 How then, or when, may we know this presence? It ‘will 
be known to curious antiquaries, sifting the ruins of time, when London is a grass-
grown path and all those hurrying along the pavement this Wednesday morning are 
but bones with a few wedding rings mixed up in their dust and the gold stoppings of 
                                                 
3 Virginia Woolf, Mrs Dalloway (Vintage (The Hogarth Press): London, 1992) at 11, 15-16. 
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innumerable decayed teeth. The face in the motor car will then be known.’4 It cannot 
be known, that is, short of a stilled end. 
Whether all this should moderate or whether it should heighten the constant 
academic lament at not being able to say what nation may be is a question that can be 
answered as we proceed, but for now the failure can prove revelatory.5 What is 
especially revealing about this failure is its persistence in the face of repeated efforts 
to overcome it. Diverse affirmations of what nation concretely is never become 
accepted either as distinctive of nation or as fully accounting for it. Nation is, in the 
result, left with no determinate content of its own. That outcome is pointedly 
confirmed in Dauvergne’s observation of a shift in the criterion taken to be most 
distinctive of nation, a shift from territoriality to control over the movement of 
peoples.6 The vacuity of nation is further confirmed by attempts to capture it in more 
transcendent terms – attempts to capture it as imagined or as an infinitely variable 
élite project, for example. These attempts, like the efforts to render nation concretely, 
also fail to produce anything that either marks nation distinctively or fully accounts 
for it. In the openness of their criteria, such attempts do intimate that nation can be, 
perhaps ‘is’, ever-changing. Yet the persistence of the efforts to endow nation with 
determinate content would at least suggest that there must be a continuous striving, a 
reductive striving perhaps, to render the protean nation in determinate terms, 
impossible as this would seem to be. 
In more familiar if perhaps more complex terms, we could relate this divide to that 
between nation as particular and nation as universal. As particular, the nation of 
                                                 
4 Ibid. at 13. 
5 For a survey and analysis elaborating on the argument that follows, see Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism 
and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001) at 111-129. 
6 Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Making People Illegal’ in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical 
Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2004) 83-99; Catherine Dauvergne, 
‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’, 67 Modern Law Review (2004) 588. 
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modern nationalism takes on a settledness and a completeness, and these are qualities 
which, historically at least, have been assumed or accepted mainly in terms of 
territory. But nation has not subsisted in such a contained and solitary way, avoiding 
any constituent relation to what is ever beyond such a straitened identity. The modern 
nation has, rather, always arrogated to itself the universal, and even if that is now 
rarely done in explicit terms, nation continues to do so through the prerogative claim 
to some commensurate capacity, such as being the exemplar of civilization or 
humanity, or through the adoption of a universalizing project, or through its quotidian 
yet illimitable relating to what is beyond its emplaced existence. There are obvious 
difficulties – difficulties to be confronted shortly – with a positive or posited 
constitution as universal, not least because if the universal ‘could ever actualise itself 
in the real world as truly universal, it would in fact destroy itself.’7 These difficulties 
were once overcome by constituting nation negatively, by setting it against those 
savages and others quite beyond the range of the universal. Being beyond the 
universal these others could only be absolutely beyond, and thence not within the 
domain of nation. This configuration changes, but its negative impetus remains, with 
the entry of almost everyone into the domain of nation. Thence, if the Orwellian 
adaptation may be forgiven, some are found to be more universal than others: some 
exemplify the universal (much) more fully than others; some have progressed or 
developed more markedly along a path to the universal than others; some belong to 
collections of elect nations typifying the universal and others do not – the great or 
imperial nations, the comity or community of nations, the developed or the advanced. 
As universal, and in opposition to the nation’s fixity as particular, nation is 
characterized by dynamism and movement, and this not only in the extraversion of 
                                                 
7 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (Zed Books: 
London, 1986) at 17. 
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nation, its going out and seeking to draw the possibility of the world to itself, but also 
in its more introverted effort to eliminate or surpass particular orders that would come 
between the nation-state and its solitary subject. Yet the universal, for all its 
constituent force, is needful of its instantiation in the particular. The particular, in 
turn, cannot protract and extend without its being drawn out by the universal. As well 
as this mutual dependence between them, there must also be a subsistent irresolution 
between the universal and the particular if the particular is to be elevated universally 
and the universal instantiated particularly. 
THE SACRED NATION 
Given these disparate yet irresolutely conjoined qualities of nation, we could return 
with more sympathy now to the unending stream of its apologists who would seek to 
say what it is and to endow it with some compendious, contained, even complete 
existence. To advance enquiry, we could take a cue from the latest book of one highly 
notable apologist, Anthony D. Smith: his Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National 
Identity.8 The book is startling in its unoriginality (and that will eventually turn out to 
be a compliment). As between nation and the sacred, there is an abundance of 
tractable analogues, to put it no stronger than that for now. Doubtless the hugely 
predominant thrust of the theory and the ideology of nationalism has been modernist 
and secular, and nationalism so conceived counters sacral attachment and atavistic 
sentiment. Somehow it does not matter that leaders readily used and use such 
sentiment and such attachment in ‘building’ and sustaining nation; somehow it does 
not matter that nation retains many of the expressive features of this sentiment and 
attachment; somehow it does not matter that nation in its early history was often 
explicitly advanced as a substitute religion; and somehow it does not matter that even 
                                                 
8 Anthony D Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2003). 
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now ‘it is difficult to separate out pre-modern and modern sources of the sanctity of 
the homeland.’9 What is so significant about all this insignificance is the richness of 
the evidence Smith advances for what he sees as the prime and continuing valency of 
the ‘deep-rooted, enduring religious beliefs and sentiments, and a powerful sense of 
the sacred’ in the constitution and the continuance of nation – beliefs, sentiments and 
a powerful sense aligned with somewhat more operative notions of the communion of 
the people, the holiness of the land, varieties of myth, of law and sacrifice.10 What the 
generosity of Smith’s instances reveal so pointedly here is the yoking of the sacred to 
the authenticity and rightfulness of nation. The claimed presence or completeness of 
nation in its particularity is elevated beyond a mundane scepticism through such 
notions as the choseness of the people, the sacredness of the land, or the sacredness of 
a community’s attachment to it.11 And the impossibility of nation’s universality is 
shielded from doubt through the attribution to nation of ‘a unique role in the moral 
economy of global salvation,’ through a redemptive ‘mission’ or portentous ‘destiny’, 
and through the exemplary identification of nation with some transcendent universal 
entity.12  
Looked at in another way, casting nation or its sources as sacred should not 
surprise us. Quite a while ago, Carl Schmitt cogently rendered the modern political 
and its forms, including sovereignty, as a secularized theology.13 Amplifying this, 
Derrida sees the sovereignty of the nation-state as a secularized theological concept.14 
But what could such an oxymoronic secularized theology be? And how might nation 
                                                 
9 Ibid. at 12, 14, 21, 26, 134. 
10 Ibid., at vii for the quotation. 
11 Ibid. at 255-6. 
12 Ibid. at 48-9, 66, 91, 203. 
13 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (translated by 
George Schwab, MIT Press: Cambridge MA, 1985) at 36; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 
(translated by George Schwab, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1996) at 42. 
14 Jacques Derrida, ‘A Discussion with Jacques Derrida’ in 5 Theory and Event (2001) at 49. 
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be conceived of in such terms? Perhaps the beginnings of an answer could be sought 
in a more straightforward theologic, exemplified for present purposes in the god of 
monotheism, and it will facilitate that search for an answer if we keep within range 
the sacred, and sacred sources, invoked by Smith. 
The monotheistic god has to take on chasmically dual characters and bring them 
into a unity. One character can be found in the omnipresent and determinate god, the 
god of perfect order, the god of constancy, caught by his, usually ‘his’, own laws, by 
‘nature,’ and forbidden by Malebranche to ‘disturb the simplicity of his ways’15 – a 
god, in short, unable to be other than what he is. The alternative god, in stark contrast, 
is one of infinite and pure possibility. He can only ever be other than what he ‘is’, 
‘absolutely unconditional and subject to no limiting rules and norms.’16 This is the 
god of miracle, of nature confounded, of mystery and revelation, boundless, 
unrepresentable, an ineffable god, a god in whose presence there can only be 
dissolution. These deific characters have to be somehow combined in an impossible 
union. For Abu Ali ibn Sina (Avicenna), God was both rationally and ‘simply’ 
contained yet uncontainedly different from everything else, and apprehended most 
completely in the ‘realm of the imagination – not through discursive reason.’17 Or, for 
Plotinus, the One ‘is Everything and Nothing; it can be none of the existing things, 
and yet it is all.’18 What would seem to be a similar divide and combining mark other 
configurations of the sacred. It is common in myths of origin, for example, to pit 
variations of order and of incipient manifestation against chaos, possibility and the 
disparate. With such mythic sources however, as with other types of the sacred, the 
                                                 
15 P Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1986) at 40. 
16 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Enlightenment (translated by Fritz C.A. Coelln and James P. 
Pettegrove, Beacon Press: Boston, 1955) at 238. 
17 Karen Armstrong, A History of God: The 4000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
(Ballantine Books: New York, 1993) at 184. 
18 Ibid. at 102. 
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divide between these dimensions is a prelude to their creative combining. Having this 
generative power, the domain of the pre-modern sacred was conceived of as one of 
‘energy’ and ‘forces,’ and it was the profane which was the place of a set ‘substance’ 
and of ‘things’.19
This contrasts with a reduced or constrained modern meaning of ‘sacred’. In that 
reduction, the sacred is made fixed or inviolate, a matter of unshakeable belief or of 
what enduringly is, yet something also to be protected, enduringly ‘held’ against 
challenges to it. Sacredness is thence attributed to property and the nation, law and the 
constitution, life and stem cells. Doubtless this represents a much-remarked 
dimension of the sacred generally.20 The boldest of contrary claims for a still 
unbounded sacred is made by Eliade: ‘the outstanding reality is the sacred; for only 
the sacred is in an absolute fashion, acts effectively, creates things and makes them 
endure.’21 Neither effective action, nor the creation of things, nor their enduring can 
be in stasis, any more than they can be in nothing but change. Operatively, the sacred 
becomes the combining of its own antithetical dimensions into force and form. As 
such, and for Bataille, ‘the sacred is essentially that which, although impossible, is 
nonetheless there.’22 It is there as a resolution in-between its antithetical dimensions, 
but it is only ever an expedient, a resolution ‘for the time being’. More bluntly, 
resolution as the outcome of the sacred ritual is a deception.23 The resolved reality 
which the ritual, or office, or system, or symbolism, or law would enclose – and 
would shore up with iterations, incantations and solemnities – that reality subsists in 
                                                 
19 Roger Caillois, Man and the Sacred (translated by Meyer Barash, The Free Press of Glencoe: 
Illinois, 1959) at 34. 
20 E.g. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (translated by Patrick Gregory, Johns Hopkins University 
Press: Baltimore, 1977) at 39. 
21 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return or, Cosmos and History (translated by Willard R. 
Trask, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1965) at 11 (his emphasis). 
22 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy: Volume II The History of 
Eroticism: Volume III Sovereignty (translated by Robert Hurley, Zone Books: New York, 1991) at 214. 
23 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, supra note 20, at 5-7; Theodor W Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (translated by John Cumming, Verso: London, 1979) at 50-1. 
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its unsettling appetency for what is illimitably beyond it. And what is beyond 
‘remains ‘here below’, remains in rapport’ with the enclosed reality.24 The enclosing, 
the protecting of the reality, the bringing to form and identity, is always a denial of 
what could otherwise be or have been, a sacrifice – ‘the first representational 
economy’25 – to invoke another momentous mode of effecting the sacred. 
Once upon a time – that once which we now put upon a time – these contrary 
dimensions of the sacred were ‘resolved’ through a reference to a transcendent 
beyond, such as a reference to that god of monotheism we encountered a little earlier. 
Various entities which were existent yet partook of the transcendent, sovereigns and 
myths of origin for example, mediated between these contrary dimensions, combining 
them operatively, assuming a constituent unity, yet all the while retaining ‘something 
of that duality’ mediated, ‘namely an ambiguous and equivocal character.’26 The 
world infused by such entities was still an heterogeneous one, not only as between the 
sacred and the profane but also as between the contrary dimensions of the sacred, a 
difference found in its famed ‘ambiguous’ character, as Agamben has it, an ambiguity 
captured in his elaboration of the Latin where ‘sacer means vile, ignominious, and 
also august, reserved for the gods; both the law and he who violates it are sacred.’27 
This vile sacred is the sacred as transgressive, ever challenging the existent and set 
order, something that was once channelled in rituals and roles every bit as 
conspicuous and ‘public’ as those attending the sacred as revered.  
                                                 
24 Joseph Libertson, Proximity, Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille, and Communication (Martinus Nijhoff: 
The Hague, 1982) at 7. 
25 Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and ‘the jews’ (translated by Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts, 
University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1990) at 21. 
26 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology, I (translated 
by John and Doreen Weightman, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1986) at 226. 
27 Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (translated by K.E. Pinkus with 
Michael Hardt, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1991) at 105. 
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As against this heterogeneity, the new-created secular or rational world is one freed 
infinitely from any determining reference to a sacred realm set beyond our profane 
reality. Yet there is a view, clean contrary if less remarked, which sees modernism as 
an ironic apotheosis of the sacred rather than its utter denial, and this perception is 
something more thoroughgoing than those partial or exceptional resemblances some 
find between what were once manifestations of the sacred and their now attenuated 
secular counterparts. Notably, Adorno and Horkheimer in their critique of 
Enlightenment would render modernism itself as perfected myth, myth here being a 
form of the sacred, and they would find the sacred pervading the very modernity that 
would deny it: ‘In the enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane. In 
its blank purity, the reality which has been cleansed of demons and their conceptual 
descendants assumes the numinous character which the ancient world attributed to 
demons.’28 With this ‘disenchantment of the world,’ with ‘this dissolution of myth 
and the substitution of knowledge for fancy,’ and with the world straitened to ‘the 
known, one and identical,’ the now pervasively numinous reality takes what was 
beyond, what was transcendent, into itself.29 Yet in so doing, it would still claim 
intrinsically to oppose, surpass and displace the world of the sacred – something 
which Adorno and Horkheimer also observe, inevitably.30  
Given the analysis so far and the august authority of Adorno and Horkheimer, we 
could perhaps comfortably conclude that modernity is constituted within the very 
sacred it would deny. That conclusion could then be related to the sacred abiding in 
the unitary nation and its ‘sources’,31 to nation as that which ‘is’ of the sacred, yet of a 
sacred denied. In the result, we somehow know what nation ‘is’ but only when we are 
                                                 
28 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, supra note 23, at 28. 
29 Ibid. at 3, 39. 
30 Ibid. at 46. 
31 Smith, Chosen Peoples, supra note 8. 
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not asked to say what it is. That resolution could be bolstered by invoking renowned 
authority to the effect that nation must be seen as purely ‘imagined’, or that 
sovereignty can only now be a private, ‘subjective’ experience.32 And that would 
complete the exordial agenda. But not quite. To say that the modern, enlightened, 
secular nation is something sacred is not to say it is the same as a pre-modern sacral 
entity. It matters that what is constituent of nation is also denied in it. And denied in 
nation’s ambient modernity with its own constituent claim to an homogenous 
universality. Let me now explore that denial a little further as it will be central to my 
overall argument. 
THE DETERMINATE NATION 
Seeing nation as something we imagine does not account for why we imagine it as 
nation. There are attendant palpabilities to nation, such as territory, and even if none 
of these is taken as compendiously accounting for nation, they do lend materiality to 
imagination. And, further, these palpabilities would seem to provide more than a 
subjective experience of sovereignty and, indeed, would seem to substantiate nation 
every bit as effectively as those ‘public’ rituals and roles embodying the pre-modern 
sovereign. National sovereignty is somehow taken to be determinately emplaced yet 
possessed of an unconstrained and universal efficacy, able to be self-enclosed and 
self-adequate yet indefinitely extensive, and able to subsist finitely whilst incipiently 
encompassing what is ever beyond that finite existence. Understandably then, 
Rousseau would describe a variant of this sovereignty as ‘sacred’,33 and it can now be 
such, ostensibly, without a transcendent reference. Nation is rendered existent through 
its extensive openness always becoming immanent to its determinate particularity and, 
                                                 
32 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(2nd edn, Verso: London, 1991); Bataille, The Accursed Share, supra note 22, at 233. 
33 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (translated by Maurice Cranston, Penguin: London, 
1968) at 50. 
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as Deleuze and Guattari aptly counsel, ‘whenever immanence is interpreted as 
immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the 
transcendent.’34  
This bringing to the determinate of the extensive openness of nation, of its 
orientation towards the universal, constantly throws up the inadequacy of the 
determinate. In the result national sovereignty ever fails in its being self-adequate. 
This failure has to be repeatedly rectified and accommodated to national sovereignty 
if its integral identity is to be sustained. Modern law is the determinative means of so 
doing, a law aptly characterized by legal positivists as a national or ‘municipal’ law, 
as a subordinated expression of national sovereignty. Yet it is also something 
necessarily more extensive than the operative existence of national sovereignty, for 
law must be capable of going beyond the failures of national sovereignty and bringing 
that beyond into a secure determination. Yet even in this extending beyond, national 
law remains caught by the generative orientation of nation, caught by that bringing of 
what is beyond into a singularly determinate yet surpassing place. The movement of 
modern law and of modern nation alike is an imperial one. 
I will now hasten to situate that culminating proposition about nation and national 
sovereignty. The very effort at situating returns us to the initial conundrum of how 
such nation and such sovereignty can be placed and delimited when their constituent 
claim is one to illimitability, and when both these contrary dimensions must subsist 
compatibly in an homogenous, secularized reality. The gist of my argument has been 
that they cannot. The incompatibility is so stark that to reveal it should take but little 
enquiry into a situated actuality. And if, as Kedourie would have it, ‘nationalism 
                                                 
34 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchill, Verso: London, 1994) at 45. 
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sprang fully armed from the head of Immanuel Kant and the Enlightenment’,35 then 
we need only follow the enlightened Kantian injunction to pursue any enquiry without 
constraint, daring to face any consequence.36 We may feel inhibited in so doing by 
Kant’s prohibition of just such an enquiry since, for Kant, it would be ‘futile’ and 
would constitute ‘a menace to the state.’37 We could perhaps now readily agree that 
enquiry would be ‘futile’ if one were after an enduringly resolved answer as to what 
nation or sovereign power may ‘be’. And we may also agree that the revelation of 
intrinsic irresolution in the constitution of nation and of sovereign power would be a 
menace to set and self-secure instantiations of the state. That Kant fully appreciated 
all this is evident in his intimating that, should we seek enlightenment on this score,  
should we dare to know, we would find that resolution had to resort to something 
‘sacred,’ to some ‘infallible supreme legislator,’ even if that source is ‘an idea 
expressed as a practical principle of reason.’38  
THE CHALLENGED NATION 
Allow me, then, to seek practical reason in Canadian cases affirming national 
sovereignty as sacred and unquestionable in the face of secular challenges to it 
advanced by indigenous peoples. An expansive point of entry to this setting, and a 
first foray here ab origine, is provided by the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court 
in R v Van der Peet.39 There Chief Justice Lamer briefly derived content for 
‘aboriginal rights’ and ‘aboriginal title’ from decisions attributed to Chief Justice 
Marshall in the Supreme Court of the United States in the early nineteenth century.40 
By way of a borrowing from significant academic authority, Chief Justice Lamer finds 
                                                 
35 See Smith Chosen Peoples, supra note 8, at 11. 
36 Cassirer, Philosophy of Enlightenment, supra note 16, at 65. 
37 Immanuel Kant, Kant's Political Writings (translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1970) at 147. 
38 Ibid. at 143. 
39 (1996) 2 SCR 507 (‘Van der Peet’). 
40 Ibid. at paras 35-7. 
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that these so-called Indian cases provide ‘structure and coherence to an untidy and 
diffuse body of customary law based on official practice,’ and that the cases are ‘as 
relevant to Canada as they are to the United States.’41 He immediately goes on to 
consider what is taken to be the ‘leading’ case of this kind, Johnson v. M’Intosh,42 a 
case which accorded some recognition to indigenous title but one which is more aptly 
seen by Robert Williams as seminal in bringing occidental colonization, with ‘its wars 
and acts of genocide directed against Indian people,’ within the rule of law, or a claim 
to the rule of law.43 In a more compliant vein, for Bartlett this case has ‘been 
recognized throughout the common law world’ as the origin of a native title which 
provides ‘the only possible accommodation of the rights of settlers and Aboriginal 
people.’44 The immediate problem with Marshall’s judgement in this case is that its 
‘structure and coherence’ remain quite elusive despite increasingly fantastic attempts 
to locate it.45 Not the least indication of this absence of structure and coherence is that 
Marshall himself frequently acknowledged it, and not the least acknowledgement 
concerned the very issue to be decided in the case: whether indigenous people could 
transfer title in their land to settlers.  
With some regard, perhaps, to a recent revolution based on universal or natural 
rights, on the rights of all ‘men’, Marshall did recognise that Indian peoples had 
‘natural rights’ in their land, including the right to transfer ownership.46 To deny them 
that right, which the case did, was indefensible, but ‘may, we think, find some excuse, 
                                                 
41 Ibid. at para. 35; Brian Slattery, ‘Understanding Aboriginal Rights’ 66 The Canadian Bar Review 
(1987) 727, at 739. 
42 (1823) 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (‘Johnson’). 
43 Robert Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest 
(Oxford University Press: New York, 1990) at 325. 
44 Richard Bartlett, ‘Mabo: another triumph for the common law’ 15 Sydney Law Review (1993) 178 at 
182-3. 
45 E.g. Eric Kades, ‘History and interpretation of the great case of Johnson v. M’Intosh’ 19 Law and 
History Review (2001), <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/19.1/kades.html> (visited 7 
May 2005). 
46 Johnson (1823) 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, at 563. 
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if not justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been 
wrested from them.’47 It may not be incidental to add that to have done otherwise 
could well have proved disastrous for the fledgling union of the United States.48 But 
returning to the lamentable character and habits of Indian peoples, what these 
amounted to was ‘the condition of a people with whom it was impossible to mix, and 
who could not be governed as a distinct entity.’49 That mixture of separation with 
subordination – which has, of course, endured – was still not enough for a further 
outcome of the case: its upholding grants of land made by the settler states. The 
fragile bridge between this outcome and the restriction on Indian peoples’ natural 
right to alienate lands was limned by Marshall in this way: ‘However this restriction 
may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet if it be 
indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled, and be adapted 
to the actual condition of the two people, it may perhaps be supported by reason, and 
certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.’50  
The title founding such righteous settlement flows from ‘discovery’ by the British. 
Marshall fully acknowledges the arbitrary quality of ‘discovery’ in the next case Chief 
Justice Lamer considers, that of Worcester v. Georgia.51 Here Marshall found it 
‘difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quarter of the 
globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the 
other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other 
should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the pre-
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existing rights of its ancient possessors.’52 No further regard was had to that 
‘difficulty’, however. 
That could still not be the end of Marshall’s anfractuous journey. Returning to the 
leading case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, in Marshall’s view discovery only entitled the 
discoverer to acquire or conquer lands discovered. He recognized that the settlers’ 
overweening claims to the whole national territory corresponded to effective 
conquest. This, he also recognized however, was a conquest that had not taken place. 
Nor must it be considered to have taken place since, in Marshall’s concept of it, the 
law of conquest meant that ‘the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the 
conquerors or safely governed as a distinct people’; and as we have just seen, they 
could be neither: they were ‘a people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who 
could not be governed as a distinct entity.53 Marshall putatively resolved the 
conundrum like this:  
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been 
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has 
been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the 
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be 
questioned.54  
There was something in addition to this pretension of force which also could not be 
gainsaid, and that was the ‘right’ of ‘society’ conceived of as ‘the nation…to 
prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved.’55  More 
immediately, it was ‘the government’ which has ‘given us…the rule for our 
                                                 
52 Ibid. at 542-3. 
53 Johnson (1823) 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, at 589-90. 
54 Ibid. at 591. 
55 Ibid. at 572. 
 16
decision.’56 By the time of Worcester, less than a decade later, a spectral conquest had 
acquired more substance: ‘power, war, conquest, give rights which, after possession, 
are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom 
they descend.’57 That same and now ‘irresistible power’ has excluded Indian peoples 
‘from intercourse with any other European potentate,’ that being ‘the single 
exception’ to such peoples ‘retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil’,58 apparently forgetting that the natural right of alienation had 
already been ‘excepted’ in Johnson v. M’Intosh. 
There is then, if Marshall is to remain the chosen oracle, much which, echoing 
Kant, ‘cannot be questioned,’ or ‘drawn into question,’ or which must ‘never be 
controverted.’ I will now take that imperative unquestioning, that straitened 
acceptance, as a provocation to explore further what cannot be questioned and why. 
First, however, there is another case which Chief Justice Lamer calls in aid, one which 
has often been cited in the Canadian cases, and that is the decision of the Australian 
High Court in Mabo v The State of Queensland (No.2).59 Here the almost cursory 
concern of the Chief Justice is with the finding by the High Court that indigenous 
peoples had ‘native title.’ A more sedulous examination of that case would reveal 
basic similarities with Johnson and Worcester, not just in their constricting the title of 
‘encapsulated societies,’ to borrow the phrase from Geertz,60 but also in the 
prohibiting by Mabo of any questioning of how this all came about.61 With Mabo, and 
cognate cases, this is a self-denial, a matter of courts not being able to enquire into the 
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exercise of a sovereign power of acquisition, bolstered by a concern that the outcome 
could be ‘embarrassing’.62 Yet the disruptive intrusion of such enquiry recurs 
throughout the judgements in Mabo, making the whole process no less turbid than that 
of Marshall’s convoluted but more candid engagement. And Mabo goes further than 
Marshall, in a sense, in finding the original ground of colonial acquisition in 
Australia, terra nullius, to have been invalid. Yet the acquisition miraculously 
remains valid, or  remains at least a founding transgression which cannot be enquired 
into.  
Before bringing this strange prohibition on enquiry to the Canadian situation, there 
is another set of cases, these coming from South Africa, decided recently and after the 
accommodating contribution of Van der Peet. Those cases have been considered in 
some detail by Hanri Mostert and myself in that over-optimistic realm of academic 
self-reference known as ‘elsewhere’,63 and I merely mention them here so as to 
dramatize the significance of national sovereignty in that the South African cases 
arrive in the end at the same outcomes and in much the same ways as the Canadian, 
Australian and US cases, and indeed rely on these, but do so in the explicitly elevated 
setting of a liberated and democratic South Africa – not, that is, in the context of 
continually oppressive settler states. 
THE IMPERIAL NATION 
To focus now on the injunction against enquiry in the Canadian setting may not 
seem propitious in that the Canadian courts seem to have come entirely to avoid 
enquiry. Reassuringly, however, the demand for enquiry does invade the judgements 
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of these courts in oblique and muted ways.64 Much more manifestly, however, there is 
a ‘blocking’ of judicial enquiry effected by an ‘unreflecting acceptance of the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples,’ an assertion the 
effectiveness of which, in one pointed judicial estimate, there can ‘from the outset 
never [be] any doubt.’65 It is that sovereign assertion which ‘defines the terrain on 
which Aboriginal peoples must operate if they are going to dispute the Crown’s 
actions in Canadian Courts.’66 Such an encompassing outcome is already given by 
way of reference to the precedent ‘authority’ of the cases we have just considered, 
authority already endowing pre-existent ‘structure and coherence’ on that outcome.67 
All of which is in a sense unexceptional since resort to authority of this kind is a 
standard mode of illusory reference, a covering of ontological bareness, characteristic 
of legal reasoning.68  
In short, as a result of Van der Peet and Delgamuukw v British Columbia69 and 
other recent cases, now ‘Canada assumes that its acquisition of sovereignty and 
underlying title with respect to Indigenous peoples is unproblematic.’70 As it is 
rendered in such cases, an entirely surpassing sovereignty effects a remarkable 
reversal. The seeming protection of Aboriginal rights in section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act 1982, such rights being ‘hereby recognized and affirmed,’ becomes 
‘potentially eliminative’ of these same rights.71 There is yet some obeisance to 
plurality. ‘A court must take into account the perspective of the aboriginal people 
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claiming the right’72 as well as the perspective of ‘the common law.’73 However, the 
‘Aboriginal…perspective must be framed in terms cognizable to the Canadian legal 
and constitutional structure,’ for ‘aboriginal rights exist within the general legal 
system of Canada.’74 Even though the much vaunted purpose of section 35 is 
‘reconciliation,’ this has to be a ‘reconciling of pre-existing Aboriginal societies with 
the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canada.’75  Aboriginal title enters into 
contention only because it ‘crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted.’76 Nor 
can sovereignty’s diapason allow of a common idiom of contention. An attenuated 
noblesse oblige may allow of some recognition of an Aboriginal idiom, but evidence 
presented in that way must ‘not strain “the Canadian legal and constitutional 
structure.”’77 In all, the ostensible protection of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the 
constitution amounts to no more than the legislature needing to have an ‘objective’ 
that is ‘compelling and substantial’ in order to eliminate them.78 ‘The range of 
legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of Aboriginal title is fairly 
broad,’ added Chief Justice Lamer before going on helpfully to list an enormously 
‘broad’ set of indicative ‘objectives.’79 The terminus ad quem arrived at by the Chief 
Justice is that, in achieving such objectives, the very ‘limiting’ of Aboriginal rights – 
rights which can thereby be limited to extinction – is ‘a necessary part of the 
reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader political community of which 
they are part.’80  
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What follows from all this is a sustaining of the whole sorry and standard panoply 
of colonial encompassment: of the subordination and filtering of the ‘rights’ of the 
colonized through the benign hold of the colonizer;81 of these ‘rights’ being 
confidently entrusted to the ‘honour and good faith’ of the colonizer;82 of the ‘special 
bond’ tying the colonized to ‘the land,’ to inalienable land which cannot be used in 
any way that would ‘destroy’ its ‘unique’ value as part of their ‘traditional way of 
life’;83 of their laws, customs and very ‘aboriginality’ being dependent on a ‘highly 
contextual’ and factual finding by the courts of the colonizer.84 As Chief Justice 
Lamer cautions, with emphasis, the rights which section 35(1) of the constitution 
‘recognizes and affirms are aboriginal,’ and this ‘aboriginality’ means that the ‘rights 
cannot…be defined on the basis of the philosophical precepts of the liberal 
enlightenment,’ on the basis of their being ‘general and universal.’85
All of which imports a conception of rights that is intrinsically insupportable. Such 
putative ‘aboriginal’ rights are existently encompassed by blocks of temporality – 
blocks prescribed by judges in ways that are markedly and tellingly varied. A 
sampling: the so-called rights depend on their being ‘integral’ to a reified, a stunted 
‘distinctive culture’ which is ‘pre-contact’; and such rights depend as well on their 
continuing in existence since ‘contact’.86 Or, with title to land, the temporal 
touchstone becomes the time at which the colonist arrogated ‘sovereignty’; but, again, 
there has also to be a continuing and broadly invariant occupation of the land 
combined in some miasmic measure with ‘aboriginal law’.87 Or it suffices for ‘the 
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aboriginal right…to have been sufficiently significant and fundamental to the culture 
and social organization of the aboriginal group…for a substantial continuous period of 
time,’ with ‘the reference period of 20 to 50 years’ being helpfully advanced.88 And 
so on. The latter periodization, borrowed from Justice Heureux-Dubé, is part of her 
dissent from such pre-contact or sovereign retrospections as those just instanced. For 
her, these formulas recognise only ‘frozen rights’ by failing to ‘permit their evolution 
over time’; instead, there has to be a ‘‘dynamic right’ approach’ in which ‘aboriginal 
rights must be permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs 
of the natives as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the 
overall society in which they live.’89 ‘Permitting’ rights to have this more indefinite 
temporal basis, however, only attenuates the more draconic formulations of her 
colleagues. This test still primally delimits the supposed rights in a way that is 
incompatible with the nature of rights.90
Bluntly, a right cannot be a rendering of the future in terms of a hypostatic past. 
Rather, rights are constituted iteratively in the converting of a past by way of its 
responsive relation to the future. It could be said, in some kind of descriptive sense, 
that such and such were the rights which certain people had in a past. But in a 
performative sense, and in an operatively legal sense, rights cannot be so hermetically 
contained. Doubtless, as Borrows points out, ‘there is a certain amount of truth to the 
statement that Aboriginal rights are fact and site specific.’91 This is so with any right. 
There has to be a pre-existent content to the assertion of a right, but the right cannot 
be enduringly confined to any pre-existent. As a normative claim on futurity, a right 
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has to be able always to become other than what it ‘is’. It generatively trajects beyond 
any contained condition, temporal or otherwise. Such is the impelling element of a 
right’s being ‘general and universal,’ of its surpassing any specificity – returning to 
Chief Justice Lamer’s ‘enlightened’ formulation.92  
The instantiated sovereign seeks to encompass and embody right. The sovereign 
must, as we saw, originate and subsist not just in itself, in its instantiated and specific 
self, but also in relation to an infinite beyond of itself, a beyond inevitably contrary 
and contested. Assiduous enquiry into the constituent conditions of sovereign right 
would reveal its partial and provisional nature, would reveal that its ‘generality must 
[also] be specific.’93 It would reveal the historical and, which is the same thing, the 
continuing delimitation of its claim to authority. What shields Kant’s ‘supreme 
power,’ what preserves Auden’s ‘folded lie’ that is ‘the State’,94 is the attribution to it 
of a completeness, a universality in its ‘taking place,’ thus obviating any contained 
relation to an origin, to anything beyond itself.95 This is not only Kant’s own 
‘extravagant pretension,’ to borrow Marshall’s phrase. It is the operative claim of a 
modernist sovereignty, or of a sovereignty persisting into modernity. Supreme 
authority, then, is inevitably delimited in its finitude, yet its sovereign capacity must 
be elevated beyond limit; and this classic conundrum of sovereign power can in 
modernity no longer be solved, after a fashion, through a transcendental reference 
joining determinate rule to deific scope.  
So far the very vacuity and ‘extravagant pretension’ of cases of foundation may not 
disturb a like vacuity and extravagance of the sovereign claim to universality and 
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infinite extension. And the injunction against enquiry in the more recent of these cases 
may shield a national sovereignty against, borrowing the term again from Mabo, 
‘embarrassing’ revelation of the threadbare nature of sovereignty’s claim to an 
emplaced finitude or to a determinate authority. If, however, we go to the great 
originals in this line of cases, the so-called Indian cases in the United States, then we 
find an unabashed, if no less embarrassing identification of the determinate. We 
should come to this matter with the genealogical depth imported by Schmitt’s account 
of how the appropriations of the Americas could ‘take place’ as they did, and of how 
such appropriations accorded with the ‘spatial orders’ of occidental sovereignty and 
law.96 For present purposes, however, let me simply remark on a striking similarity. 
In the longue durée of the colonization of the Americas, Schmitt delineates its 
hypostatization as a fusion of an enveloping geography and cartography with a mix of 
militarism, science and culture.97 In a somewhat shorter durée, Marshall’s soaring 
global range emplaced indigenous peoples of the Americas within a transcendent 
domain of ‘our maps, geographical treaties,’ ‘nautical science,’ and ‘our arts and our 
arms.’98 In relation specifically to grounding the sovereign subordination of 
indigenous peoples, we saw that there was sufficient grounding quiddity for Marshall 
if this subordination were an inexorable response to the depraved condition of such 
peoples or if it simply flowed from the historical fact of ‘discovery.’ Sovereign 
arrogation could also emanate for Marshall, just as simply, from ‘the actual state of 
things,’ or there was the deific fallback of its being brought about by ‘the Creator of 
all things,’ or more robustly, by ‘the sword’; or it could, still simply, be that which has 
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been ‘asserted’.99 Or, as Justice Johnson put it a little more expansively in deciding a 
case with Marshall, ‘it cannot be questioned that the right of sovereignty, as well as 
soil, was notoriously asserted and exercised by the European discoverers. From that 
source we derive our rights,’ the questioning of which derivation by indigenous 
peoples being apt only for an ‘appeal…to the sword and to Almighty justice, and not 
to courts of law or equity.’100  
So, the search for a determinate nation and its sovereign being returns us with a 
seeming inevitability to the sacred, either explicitly in the invocation of a deity, or in 
the surpassing, wilful assertion of the colonizer, a generative assertion endowing what 
would otherwise remain inert and inconsequential. The efficacy of that arrogation has 
been confirmed for our time by the finding of the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal that the terms of colonization depend on the intent of the colonizer.101 The 
replete and permeating being of the colonizer is at one with the Kantian will which 
‘proved to be the revolutionary source of the doctrine of national self-determination 
developed by his followers.’102 And this is nation constituted as ‘an undivided 
subject…possessed of a unitary self and a singular will that arose from its essence … 
[a subject] capable of autonomy and sovereignty.’103 Enclosed in its primal and pre-
emptive completeness, such nation comes to what is beyond it with an appropriative 
sameness. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, then, we could apply to this primal completeness of nation the radical 
criticism which Balibar would make of ‘the proposition presupposed by most of the 
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arguments concerning politics and power: that an efficient action can take place only 
when the agent has an exclusive control over some resources and is able to use them 
as a unified “sovereign subject,” at the very least enjoying a stable and recognized 
identity.’104 Balibar’s criticism can, in turn, be exemplified in the ‘reconciliation’ 
provided for in section 35 of the constitution. The verb ‘to reconcile’ can import being 
acceptantly reconciled to something, reconciled to one’s fate for example. That is a 
meaning which operatively infects the noun ‘reconciliation’ as it is judicially 
extracted from section 35, a reconciliation of indigenous peoples to something that 
will always and ultimately require their submission. To what is complete and 
homogenous there can only be a reconciling to.105 But ‘reconciliation’ as a noun 
cannot be reconciled to such a claustration. In van der Walt’s luminous perception: 
‘the patently reconcilable is in no need of reconciliation. It is the irreconcilable that 
calls for and opens up the possibility or perhaps of reconciliation.’106 And of such 
reconciliation there can be no end: it ‘is always to come’.107 Which is not to deny the 
impelling necessity of emplaced positions, of archaic formations, of things to be 
reconciled. Yet ‘displacement’ or ‘the process of dislocation is no less arch-originary, 
that is, just as “archaic” as the archaism that is always dislodged.’108 So just as 
impelling as emplaced position is the displacement of position, the moving through 
and out beyond position receptively towards each other, impelling not just of a 
particular process of reconciliation but of our very being.  
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